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PLANTS AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY* 
Since the late nineteenth century, private plant breeders in the United States, like those 
elsewhere, have long been concerned with what they term "breeder's rights" or what lawyers call 
the protection of intellectual property. Such property arises, in general, from the investment of 
time, money, and ingenuity that produces a new type of plant variety or -- a much disputed 
category -- exploits the finding of one. (A plant variety generally means an assemblage of 
cultivated individuals that is distinguished from its counterparts in some set of characters --
physical, morphological, or otherwise -- and that retains its distinguishing features when 
reproduced.) Having created such property, private breeders have held that they have a right in it. 
They have also sought to obtain protection of their property right in various ways, including 
private arrangements and, with increasing vigor, public policy and law, especially in the patent 
system. Horticulturalists first attempted to obtain patent protection for their products in 1906. 
They did not succeed until the passage of the Plant Patent Act in 1930, which was a limited 
victory for plant breeders, since it applied only to horticultural products.1 The 1935 Bankhead-
Janes Act, which included major provisions for agricultural research, and the 1952 revision of 
U.S. patent law, a sweeping overhaul, were both silent on issues of intellectual property protection 
for plants in general. 
However, in 1970 Congress provided protection for a broad range of plants by enacting the 
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).2 Since then, the range and type of intellectual property 
protection for living organisms has been enlarged in a whirlwind rush -- with a 1980 act to 
extend the coverage of the PVPA; the 1980 Supreme Court decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
which gave patent protection to living microrganisms; and the extensions of that decision by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office in 1985 and 1987, through, respectively, Ex parte 
Hibberd, which ruled that any type of plant could in principle be patented, and Ex parte Allen, 
which held that so could living animals.3 
The tale raises important historiographic questions: Why was the victory of the Plant Patent 
Act not enlarged until 1970? Why was it broadened then? And why has it been so much expanded 
since then? An exploration of these questions reveals a good deal about the historical interplay 
among breeding science, economic interests and circumstances, private arrangements, and public 
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law that has shaped intellectual property protection in plants. We here examine that interplay --
first, as background to the shift in 1970; second, to account for the shift; and third, to suggest 
reasons for the speedy extension of intellectual property protection to living organisms in general 
during the last quarter of a century. 
* * * 
Through much of the nineteenth century, plant innovation in the United States depended 
heavily upon plant importation. In 1839, the U.S. Patent Office began importing plant varieties 
from around the globe, a practice formalized, in 1862, in the act that established the Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), which, among other things, enjoined the agency "to procure, propagate, 
and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants." The Department 
accomplished the distribution by sending out packets of seeds -- in 1897, a record-high of more 
than twenty-two million of them -- free to American farmers. However, in the late nineteenth 
century, partly in response to the glut in the world wheat markets, the Department of Agriculture 
began to develop a commitment to the innovation of new grains of high quality that might find 
strong export market demand.4 By the early twentieth century the Hatch Act of 1887, which 
established federal support for agricultural experiment stations, and the Adams Act of 1906, 
which provided federal grants for agricultural research, were providing increasingly handsome 
federal subsidies for research in plants. These measures reflected Congressional acceptance of the 
idea that American agriculture was shifting from an extensive growth pattern arising from the 
addition of land, water and labor to an intensive growth pattern, the result of more scientific 
application of those resources. 
Since the biological needs of its crops determined how each farm arrayed its resources, public 
agricultural stations soon began systematic breeding to improve the seeds that initiated the 
process. The large majority of plant development occurred in the greenhouses and test plots of 
the USDA and of the many agricultural experiment stations attached to state colleges and 
universities. In a recent study, Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr., concluded that through the first third of 
the twentieth century, the history of plant improvement "is essentially that of the continuous 
growth and elaboration of publicly performed research and development in a virtual vacuum of 
private investment." In 1934, one hundred twenty-eight principal varieties of wheat were grown 
in the United States; seventy-eight per cent were of public origin.5 
However, the free availability of publicly developed plants and seeds helped to foster the 
development of private plant breeding activities. Land-grant universities provided scientifically 
trained breeders and progressive farmers receptive to well-bred seed. The USDA also 
promulgated standards of practice and definition in seed testing that rationalized assessments of 
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seed quality. Most important, the new varieties provided by public stations were appropriated by 
private breeders, who tested them against local conditions and multiplied them for sale to their 
neighbors. As a result, by the late nineteenth century, a private seed industry was emerging in 
the United States -- the American Seed Trade Association had been founded in 1883 -- as was a 
flourishing private horticultural industry, members of which had formed the American 
Assocation of Nurserymen, in 1875. 
Both seedmen and horticulturalists were acutely aware that the facts of biology made their 
intellectual property vulnerable to piracy and fraud. With sexually reproducing food plants, 
farmers could harvest the seed from one year's crop and plant it the next (in 1915, for example, 
farmers themselves produced 97% of the seed they sowed for wheat).6 New varieties of many 
fruit trees, shrubs, vines, or flowering plants could be reproduced asexually -- that is, like roses, 
from cuttings or grafts. Thus, developers of such plants had no natural control over the 
reproduction of their property once it was sold. In a few years a new plant or tree could be 
anybody's plant or tree. Fraud arose from the facts of human nature: unscrupulous dealers might 
sell plants or seeds under false labels. The facts of biology helped make such fraud possible 
because it was difficult to determine whether a plant or seed was truly what it was represented to 
be or was a degenerate form taken from the progeny of an original variety. In 1896 Fruit Grower 
Magazine railed against "Injustice to New Fruits," and said many plant breeders were leaving their 
"patient toil" for lack of encouragement.? 
Plant breeders sought to protect their interests through a variety of private arrangements. The 
simplest, which assumed that the breeder would obtain no market control over succeeding 
generations of his plant, amounted to selling the first new varietals at a high price (according to 
one report, a "good-sized fortune" might be paid for half a dozen new strawberry plants). Luther 
Burbank once declared that, although he would prefer the widespread testing of all his new fruits 
and flowers, such a practice would "be a perilous risk or utter ruin to the originator, as a single 
bud or seed in the wrong hands may place an unscrupulous person on an equal footing with the 
originator" in the market. He added, reflecting on the plight of the private breeder, "Having no 
Government aid or even protection, or college endowment to back us and to pay our bills, we 
must receive early returns, in part at least, for our tremendous expenses.''8 The more complicated 
arrangements imposed contractual obligations upon the purchaser -- for example, an agreement 
that he would neither sell nor give away grafts or cuttings, and the posting of a bond that 
provided surety of compensation if he did. Stark Brothers compelled such an agreement and bond 
from every farmer who bought a Delicious apple seedling.9 
The passage of the federal Trademark Law in 1881 provided plant and seed developers a 
means to protect their intellectual property against fraud. A trademark could be any adjective or 
symbol -- for example, "Star" or "Majestic Beauty" -- or a company name such as Burpee. 
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Obtaining a trademark required merely registration of a word or stylized drawing, though the 
trademark had to be actively used to be legally maintained. The company name was the most 
valuable type of trademark, since it signified the firm offering the product, including its 
reputation for quality, rather than the size, color or type of the product itself, and could be 
employed only by the company registering it. Perhaps the most important inspiration to breeders 
in the appropriation of trademarks for plant protection was the Stark Brothers Nursery, in 
Louisiana, Missouri. In 1892, first prize at the Stark Fruit Fair -- an annual competion that the 
firm held to obtain new varieties -- went to an apple with a glossy red color that, so the story 
goes, proprietor Clarence Stark bit into and exclaimed, "Delicious! That will be its name." Stark 
tracked down the source of the apple, bought sole rights to the tree, which he surrounded with a 
tall metal fence, and trademarked the fruit as the "Stark Delicious" apple. 10 
Yet trademarking protected only the name: It did little to defend the breeder against the fact 
that the same rose by any other name might be marketed to smell as sweet. In short, 
trademarking did not protect a breeder's rights in a particular plant or fruit as such. For that 
reason, the development of the plant and seed industries was accompanied by a demand for 
protection of the breeder's intellectual property, particularly through the patent system. 
The American patent system rests on Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, 
which empowers the Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries." Congress had been 
quick to use its power, laying the foundation of American patent law in a statute that it enacted 
in 1790 and amended in 1793. Inventors were given exclusive rights in their inventions for 
fourteen years, a period drawn from British practice, which was based on the estimated time 
required to train two sets of apprentices, one after the other, in a new technique. (The American 
period was extended to seventeen years, in 1861, a compromise between the original fourteen and 
the twenty-one years that, after 1836, was allowed in exceptional cases.) But in granting the 
monopoly right, society struck a bargain with the inventor, compelling her to forgo secrecy. 
Indeed, the term "patent" derived from the phrase "letters patent" -- "open letters" -- meaning 
that in return for the protection of an exclusive right, the inventor had to disclose the details of 
his invention publicly so that other inventors, knowing its workings could try to improve upon 
it. 11 The 1793 amendment defined, in language written by Thomas Jefferson, what was 
patentable: "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
or useful improvement thereof." At the turn of the century, Jefferson's phrasing remained at the 
core of the U.S. patent code (as it does today, except for the eighteenth-century word "art," which 
was replaced in the 1952 Congressional overhaul of patent law by the word "process"). 12 
However plant patenting was legally discouraged in 1889, when the U.S. Commissioner of 
Patents upheld an examiner's rejection of an application for a patent to cover a fiber identified in 
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the needles of a pine tree. The examiner had argued that the fiber was unpatentable because it 
was undistinguishable from any other fiber. The commissioner transformed the reasoning into a 
landmark doctrine, noting that ascertaining the composition of the trees in the forest was "not a 
patentable invention, recognized by statute, any more than to find a new gem or jewel in the 
earth would entitle the discoverer to patent all gems which should be subsequently found." The 
Commissioner added that it would be "unreasonable and impossible" to allow patents upon the 
trees of the forest and the plants of the earth. As a result, it became a fundamental tenet of patent 
law that, in general, no protection could be obtained for products of nature, either inanimate or 
living. While the processes devised to extract what was found in nature could be patented, objects 
discovered there could not. They were not inventions, nor could they as a class be made anyone's 
exclusive property.13 
In 1891, in a report to the American Association of Nurserymen, the respected plant scientist 
Liberty Hyde Bailey, of Cornell University, added technical weight to the legal discouragement. 
Two years earlier Bailey had told the nurserymen that an obstacle to any type of intellectual 
property protection for plants was that new types of plants were difficult to define or specify. 
Now he pointed out that most new varieties were accidents that the nurseryman found rather than 
the product of systematic breeding, adding, however, that "when the time comes that men breed 
plants upon definite laws and produce new and valuable kinds, then plant patents may possibly 
become practicable."14 
The rediscovery of Mendel's laws at the turn of the century encouraged breeders to think that 
the era of controlled plant innovation had come to pass. Indeed, the power of Mendel's laws was 
invoked by one Hyland C. Kirk, a horticultural spokesman, when he appeared as the principal 
witness before the House Committee on Patents when it held hearings to consider the 1906 bill to 
establish intellectual property protection for plants. The measure, originally aimed at 
strengthening plant trademarks against infringement, had been revised to allow patents for 
horticultural plants, trees, and vines. Advancing a claim that would be repeated frequently in the 
debates over plant patenting, Kirk declared that the originator of a "new variety of plant, tree, or 
vine ... is as truly an inventor and, as such, as justly entitled to protection as the originator of a 
new motor, a new chemical compound, or any other valuable combination of materials requiring 
experiment, deliberation, and design."15 
Nevertheless, the bill died in committee. Evidently, few Americans considered breeding 
distinct enough from the practice of farming to warrant special protection. Farmers and 
horticulturalists might find innovation in the field in the form of plant sports or mutations that 
might be exploited. (Stark Brothers also continued to find bonanzas in the mail, notably the 
yellow apple that arrived at the nursery in a box one day in the spring of 1914 and that they soon 
marketed as the Stark Golden Delicious.) Both breeders and farmers continued to benefit from the 
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importation of new plant varieties from abroad and from the expanding activities of public 
breeders in the agriculture department and state universities, colleges, and experiment stations. 
Then, too, by practice and tradition, farmers assumed that they should enjoy free and 
unencumbered access to new seed varieties. And urban Americans probably tended, like 
Europeans, to think of food as a scarce resource and to be reluctant to grant anyone a monopoly 
right over food products, even for a limited period.16 
Although an immediate failure, the 1906 venture did lead to the formation of a lobbying 
group, the National Committee on Plant Patents, which was organized and kept alive by 
Archibald Augustine of Augustine Nurseries in Bloomington, Illinois. By the late 1920s, 
nurserymen were especially interested in patents, not least because the potential American market 
for their stocks was estimated -- according to a report delivered to the 1928 convention of the 
American Association of Nurserymen -- at one billion dollars, almost entirely on the ornamental 
side.17 When Augustine was elected president of the American Association of Nurserymen in 
1929, he was succeeded in the chairmanship of the National Committee by Paul Stark, who was 
happy to invigorate the movement for plant patenting. 
Stark was a principal in the Stark Brothers Nursery, which was now a century-old and, 
capitalized at one million dollars, was the largest breeder in the country. Stark brothers continued 
to derive some of its stock by running competitions for prize fruit specimens, but it also relied on 
more consistent sources, notably Luther Burbank. 18 Paul Stark had met Burbank in 1893, when 
Burbank was worried about making enough money to continue his research. A friendship and 
business arrangement blossomed. Stark Brothers came to own exclusive licenses to many of 
Burbank's cultivars. When Burbank died, in 1926, his will stipulated that his farm, in Santa Rosa, 
California, be converted into the Stark-Burbank Research Laboratories and Experimental 
Grounds. Stark thus inherited hundreds of varieties of plums, peaches, apples, cherries, pears, 
roses and gladiolas that had never been marketed -- and that might be patented, if patent 
protection were available. It was Stark, who, at the behest of the president of the American 
Association of Nurserymen, became the prime mover behind the 1930 Plant Patent Act. 19 
Stark himself drafted the measure. It was introduced in the Senate by John G. Townsend, Jr., 
of Delaware, who probably knew Stark and certainly had reason to sympathize with his purpose, 
since he owned 130,000 acres of apple orchards, which made him the second largest orchardist in 
the country.20 Endorsements of the bill rained down upon the Congress from horticulturalists, 
nurserymen, farmers, agricultural experiment stations, and their organized representatives, 
including the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange, the International 
Appleship Association, and the Peony and Iris Association. Thomas Edison wired that Congress 
could do nothing better for American agriculture than "to give the plant breeder the same status 
as the mechanical and chemical inventors now have through the patent law." Luther Burbank's 
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widow sent a telegram of her own declaring that her late husband would have been "unable to do 
what he did with plants had it not been for royalties from his writings and from other by-product 
lines of activity" and declared that most other plant developers were unlikely to derive such 
ancillary revenues from their work. 21 
In brief hearings, perfunctory floor debate, and the reports on the bill, its Congressional 
promoters noted the considerable dependency of plant breeding and research on governmental 
money, emphasizing that the establishment of a breeder's legal right in his innovations might 
stimulate private investment in these activities and make it possible for the breeder to reduce his 
prices. They pointed to the incentives that patent protection would give plant breeders to develop 
varieties resistant to blight and disease and rich in food or medicinal qualities; varieties that 
would strengthen public health, prosperity, and national defense -- and all without the 
expenditure of federal money. With sentimental nods to Luther Burbank, who was said to have 
made no money from his plants, the bill's enthusiasts promised that it would rescue plant breeders 
from vulnerability to piracy and the fate of an impoverished death.22 
In these first few months of the 1930s Depression, the measure appealed as a farmer's and 
plant breeder's relief bill, Hoover-Republican style. With Republicans still in control of the 
Congress, the prevailing wisdom around Washington about how to respond to the worsening 
economic slide was: encourage private enterprise, reduce government costs and activities. There 
was only scattered opposition to the bill, including some biting harassment from Congressman 
Fiorello Laguardia, who was hazy in his understanding of heredity in plants but who understood 
well that the measure did nothing for direct farm relief. The Plant Patent Act passed easily on a 
voice vote some three months after it had first been introduced. Edison cheered in The New York 
Times, "Luther Burbank would have been a rich man if he had been protected by such a patent 
bill.n23 
In a report on the bill, the House Committee on Patents, mindful of the product-of -nature 
doctrine, had addressed the constitutionality of the measure, asking: Would a new variety of plant 
be a discovery, and could its originator be considered an inventor or a discoverer? The report's 
answer: Yes, on both counts. In the reasoning of the document, while a new variety of plant 
found in the field was a product of nature and, hence, not patentable under the meaning of the 
word "discoveries" in Article I, Section 8, a new variety arising from cultivation was such a 
discovery -- and its cultivator a discoverer -- since it was created by human agency. The report 
saw no difference between "the part played by the plant originator in the development of new 
plants and the part played by the chemist in the development of new compositions of matter." 
Both took the materials of nature, exploited its laws, and, applying a variety of techniques, 
devised a new and useful product.24 
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However, at this stage of history, chemical products and plants differed from each other in 
ways that affected the type of patent protection that plants could obtain. Patent law insisted that 
an invention be disclosed specifically enough to be identically reproducible. Chemical products, as 
dead matter, were highly specifiable as to composition and methods of production and 
reproduction. Plants, as living matter, were difficult to specify in either regard. These 
differences were reflected in the Plant Patent Act, which accommodated the basic tenets of patent 
law to what we may recognize as the problem of biological specificity in intellectual property 
protection. The act limited patent protection to those plants that could be reproduced asexually. 
Often termed cloning, asexual reproduction could be accomplished by budding, grafting, rooting 
of clippings, or division of bulbs; it yielded progeny genetically identical to the parent plant or 
tree. 
The act also explicitly excluded from patentability tuber-propagated plants -- a provision that 
would substantially affect only Irish potatoes, which was a major cash crop, and Jerusalem 
artichokes, a type of sunflower that was widely used as a vegetable and a livestock feed. 
Resistance to allowing monopoly control of any type over major food stocks may have figured in 
the exclusion. However, to advocates of plant patenting, authorizing patents on tuber-propagated 
plants like the Irish potato threatened the enforceability of plant patents in general, mainly 
because the part of them that is involved in reproduction is also widely sold as food. Paul Stark 
later explained the reasoning behind the exclusion: Because potatoes were available everywhere 
"for use as food or for growing the plants," infringement of a potato-plant patent would be "easy" 
and "widespread," making enforcement "a farce." He added, "This would reflect unfavorably on 
enforcement with the other types of asexually reproduced plants -- so for that reason potatoes 
were excluded from the original Plant Patent Act in 1930."25 
Stark and his allies had perceived an equally vexing enforcement problem for patents on 
sexually reproduced plants. Such plants could not generally be relied upon to breed identically 
true to type from one generation to the next. (Sexual reproduction joins half the genes from one 
plant with half from another; over several generations, the progeny can easily drift genetically far 
from the original parental type. Indeed, the business of plant breeding was fundamentally a battle 
to limit genetic variability through succeeding generations, since farmers expected the seeds they 
bought to yield roughly similar plants.) Patents on sexually reproduced plants could not be 
enforced because the progeny would be different from the patented parent. The likely 
unenforceability prompted a special committee of the American Society for Horticultural Science 
to oppose flatly the provision of patent protection for seed-propagated plants, and it convinced 
key members of the Patent Office and the Department of Agriculture that no bill with such a 
provision could pass.26 The Congressional stewards of the bill, although they may not have 
understood the genetics, were evidently sufficiently aware that like did not necessarily breed like 
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to omit from the final measure protection for plants that were reproduced sexually. 
Despite the restricted coverage provided by the act, it was a boon to breeders like Paul Stark. 
While narrow, the category of asexually reproducible plants was capacious enough to include 
much of such breeders' stock in trade -- that is, virtually all fruit and nut trees; most small vinous 
fruits such as grapes, strawberries, and blueberries; and numerous ornamental shrubs, vines, and 
perennials, among them lilacs, wisterias, and peonies as well as roses.27 According to The First 
Plant Patents, a survey published in 1934 by a New York patent lawyer named Robert Starr 
Allyn, the government had granted eighty-four plant patents by the beginning of that year, 
including one to Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, for a red dahlia. Nine of the patents 
went to Burbank's estate for certain of his fruits and flowers. His widow assigned the patents to 
Stark Nurseries, which acquired rights to an additional five from other breeders.28 
Since the wares of seedmen comprised sexually reproducing plants, the act disappointed the 
American Seed Trade Association, which had allied itself with Stark in the plant-patent legislative 
drive. Stark defended the omission of sexually reproduced plants from the coverage of the act, 
telling the association that "it seemed to be the wise thing to get established the principle that 
Congress recognized the rights of the plant breeder and originator," predicting that once the 
principle was in place, it would be "much easier" to get protection for plants propagated by seed. 29 
However, while the act installed the principle, the intellectual property protection it provided 
was no better than the degree of biological specificity -- which was to say the least limited --
with which plants could then be identified. The act was extremely permissive in inventive 
definition, allowing patents on plants, even naturally occurring ones, that might be no more than 
minimally distinguishable from others, so long as human intervention had been required to 
reproduce the plant asexually. Its disclosure requirements, adapted to the category of living 
inventions, were also, of necessity, loose. They called for the submission of a color painting or 
photograph as well as a written description of the plant that was as "complete as is reasonably 
possible." They called for an historical preamble describing how the plant was bred or where the 
sports from which it was asexually reproduced had been found, and how it differed from the 
plants that comprised its pedigree. They asked for data concerning when the plant bloomed and 
which soils and climates best suited it. They expected a technical description outlining the color 
and shape of the bush, leaves, and flower.30 
The early applications included a few objective descriptions -- for example, lengths and the 
tones listed on Ridgway's Color Chart, a commercially manufactured set of cards, much like 
paint-sample cards, that breeders held against a plant to identify and match a name to its colors. 
it. Fruit, which was described by external appearance, might be specified by such intrinsic 
characteristics as acidity and sugar levels.31 The written descriptions advertised the commercial 
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identity of the plant because breeders had to supply a name for the new cultivar -- usually it was 
a fancy one, like Delmass Peach or Peace Rose. Otherwise, the descriptions were generally 
imprecise enough to undermine the bargain that a grant of intellectual property protection would 
be accompanied by a degree of disclosure that would permit others in the art to improve upon the 
invention. The information in the descriptions was, in fact, of little use to other breeders, 
precisely because living plants were difficult to specify as invented or inventable matter.32 
Given the relaxed nature of the disclosure requirements, critics questioned whether the Patent 
Office would be able to administer the act so as to distinguish genuine from counterfeit 
intellectual property. Their doubts were perhaps accentuated when the first examiner assigned to 
plant patents proved to be not a botanist but a mechanical engineer who was also charged with 
oversight for "Closure Operators, Fences, Gates, Tillage and Handling Implements." After a year, 
Herbert Hoover ordered the Department of Agriculture to assist the Patent Office. The first plant 
patent -- on a rose called the 'New Dawn' -- confirmed the critics' fears. An amateur gardener 
had found a bud mutation on the 'Van Fleet' rose, which had been painstakingly developed by an 
established breeder, that supposedly extended the life of the flower. Save for this "everblooming" 
quality, the New Dawn was identical to the Van Fleet. Most patents were issued to amateur 
gardeners who, finding sports and mutations on well established cultivars, assigned them to large 
nurseries.33 
Robert C. Cook, the editor of the Journal of Heredity, feared that plant patents would become 
the conceits of amateur gardeners rather than real protection for professional breeders. In the 
hope of making plant patents more like industrial patents, he proposed "type plants" as in situ 
deposits, much as the patent office in the 1800s had demanded patent models when written 
descriptions were inadequate.34 However, the imprecise disclosure of the plant patent application 
limited the protection that the federal government could offer to patent holders. In practice, the 
Plant Patent Act only prevented unauthorized advertising by the patented name. It functioned 
more as a registration system than as the kind of rigorous examination and screening system 
characteristic for industrial inventions. Because the descriptions of patented plants were so poor, 
the cornerstone of most case law surrounding the act was not whether an alleged infringer's plant 
looked like a patented one but whether it could be proved to have been cloned from it. The 
definition of the inventive act was that a plant, even one found in the wild, had been asexually 
reproduced, in a sense reduced to practice. Many applications jointly listed the discover and the 
reproducer. All the breeders really got from the act was the ability to use a tradename and a legal 
basis for infringement suits. The weakness of the protection provided by the Plant Patent Act was 
perhaps revealingly expressed by the small number of patents issued under it -- 911 in the 20 
years following its passage.35 
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The seedmen may have been disappointed, but perhaps not too much so, since they had been 
developing alternative methods of intellectual property protection, notably seed certification. In 
the late nineteenth century, state agencies had assessed seeds for both purity and performance, 
some times writing scorecards based on visual appeal for crops submitted at county fairs. At the 
turn of the century, the agencies began to measure varietal yields through actual grow-out tests, 
the winners advertising their blue ribbons. However, farmers who bought the seed saved it each 
year and sold it to their neighbors, polluting markets with adulterated seed. Reputable seed 
dealers asked the stations to certify the genetic purity of their seeds by tests showing statistically 
that a bag of seed would grow into the plant promised with good uniformity, germinability, and 
without weeds. In 1919, state agencies inaugurated certification programs, publishing lists of 
recommended varieties and sometimes refusing to certify "new" varieties that lacked a marked 
improvement in performance over varieties that were already certified.36 
While many state agricultural departments successfully imposed standards of seed quality 
within their state borders, they had no authority to prevent the importation of low-quality seed 
from other states. That deficiency led to the passage of the 1939 Federal Seed Act, the primary 
purpose of which was to permit the imposition of standards of seed-quality on seeds sold in 
interstate commerce.37 Seed certification, now national, not only defended consumers against 
unreliable seed; it also safeguarded quality seed products from the competition of less worthy 
alternatives -- and thus protected the intellectual property investment that produced the quality. 
The Federal Seed Act required that certified seed be sold only by variety name rather than by 
brand name. Now all seed in a given variety would be sold by one name, with a blue tag on the 
bag indicating that the federal government backed the purity of the contents. In many states, 
large seed firms had sold their certified seed packets under brand names and, in the interest of 
quality control, had performed free germinability tests. The act eliminated the incentives of these 
dealers to demonstrate that they met standards of certification: since there could be no product 
differentiation on certified seed, there was no point in demonstrating quality in seed 
multiplication. Prices on certified seed rapidly levelled to close to the cost of production. 
However, state agencies usually studied a new variety for five years before deciding to offer 
certification tests for it, which gave breeders a window of opportunity for introducing and 
exploiting new varieties under trademark names. By the late 1950s, more seed was sold under 
trademarks than as certified seed.38 
Yet for commercial breeders, the most tantalizing method for protecting intellectual property 
in plants came from biology itself -- through the exploitation of hybridization as it worked in the 
paradigm case of corn. Hybridized corn involved double-crossing from strains inbred to 
accentuate particular traits -- for example, the height of the ear, stalk strength, disease resistance. 
The seeds from the double-cross produced exceptionally vigorous crops, but if the seeds from the 
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crop were planted, yields would fall substantially. Hybridization thus protected the intellectual 
property of breeders -- the property itself resided in the germ plasm of the inbred strains, which 
could be kept a closely guarded secret -- through biological means, forcing farmers to buy new 
seed each year. 
In 1919, Edward M. East and and Donald F. Jones, two of the principals in the development 
of hybrid corn, pointed out the intellectual property advantages in the double-cross method that 
produced it: 
It is not a method that will interest most farmers, but it is something that may easily be taken 
up by seedsmen; in fact, it is the first time in agricultural history that a seedsman is enabled 
to gain the full benefit from a desirable origination of his own or something that he has 
purchased. The man who originates devices to open our boxes of shoe polish or to autograph 
our camera negatives, is able to patent his product and gain the full reward for his 
inventiveness. The man who originates a new plant which may be of incalculable benefit to 
the whole country gets nothing -- not even fame -- for his pains, as the plants can be 
propagated by anyone. There is correspondingly less incentive for the production of improved 
types. The utilization of first generation hybrids enables the originator to keep the parental 
types and give out only the crossed seeds, which are less valuable for continued propagation. 
According to the later testimony of Paul Stark, when in 1930 the Congress was considering the 
Plant Patent Act, seed-corn breeders thought they might get better and quicker protection from 
hybrid corn than from plant patents.39 
When introduced to Illinois in 1929 hybrid corn seeds yielded only slightly more ears of corn 
than naturally open-pollinated varieties. Yet between 1932 and 1936 the percentage of Illinois 
cornfields planted with hybrid seed rose from scarcely 1% to over 75%. Illinois farmers were 
encouraged to believe that hybrid corn was technically superior to open-pollinated varieties 
largely because a handful of large seed dealers -- notably Pioneer Hi-Brid Corn Company, Funk 
Brothers Seed Company, the DeKalb Agricultural Association, and Pfister Hybrid Corn Company 
-- encouraged them to do so, aided by the scientific authority of government agricultural 
institutions. (Hybridized corn decidedly advantaged large seed firms, those with the land to raise a 
wide variety of inbred strains as well as the manpower to test the crossing.) Breeders physically 
cloistered their plots of inbred strains with barbed wire and armed guards. Only top management 
was privy to the pedigree sequence. By 1950, following years of research investment by private 
breeders, the yields of hybrid corn far exceeded those of open-pollinated corn.40 
Paul Stark remembered that in 1930 breeders of seed plants had been as optimistic as the 
seed-corn men about obtaining intellectual property protection from hybrid methods. And in the 
1940s and 1950s, major breeders of seed crops such as wheat sought in hybridization the kind of 
intellectual property protection it had given their counterparts in corn. Besides, in the immediate 
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postwar years, the devastation in Europe and foreign aid programs made an assured market for 
the export of U.S. agricultural products, innovative or not. If for more than thirty years following 
the passage of the Plant Patent Act there was no drive for the legislative extension of patent 
protection to sexually reproducing plants, it was very likely because the lure of hybridization 
joined with the system of contracts, bonds, certifications, and trademarks to make additional 
intellectual property protection seem unnecessary. 
* * * 
The seedmen's apparent satisfaction with the status quo through the postwar decade turned to 
increasing dissatisfaction by the 1960s. The reasons for the shift are circumstantial but clear 
enough. The basic textbooks on plant breeding of the day suggest that the high expectations for 
hybridization were falling far short of realization. While hybridization had succeeded with onion, 
sugar beets, and sorghum, it had failed with a number of other plants, notably wheat.41 Nor had 
there been any dramatic breakthrough in breeding methods. However, an accumulation of 
different biological methods, many of them adapted from cytological genetics, had added 
considerable power to the effectiveness of conventional breeding, forming a new arsenal for 
improving plants and maintaining the stability of varieties. The methods included speed breeding 
with backcrossing that allowed, for example, the development of varieties of oats resistant to rust 
in seven years instead of ten; very large-scale selection programs that yielded an abundance of 
advantageous strains; the induction of polyploidy to manipulate desirable plant characters such as 
quality and hardness, and of monosomy as well as nullisomy to identify linkages between 
characters and chromosomes.42 
The Green Revolution fostered by the work of Norman E. Borlaug was moving into full 
fecundation, transforming the productivity of Third World agriculture by the introduction of new 
varieties in conjunction with the use of chemical fertilizers. (Borlaug would be awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1970 for his achievements.) His work added credibility to a claim that plant 
breeders were increasingly advancing about the relationship between intellectual property 
protection and the world's food supply. If historically there had been a cultural assumption that 
grants of monopoly incentives, even temporary ones like patents, might threaten the availability 
of food, by the early 1970s breeders were doing their best to reverse the assumption. Of course, 
Borlaug 's innovative breeding program had been carried out in Mexico with the support of the 
Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and Borlaug acquired no intellectual property protection in the 
resulting plants.43 No matter to private plant breeders: In their increasingly common argument, 
the grant of temporary monopolies in the development of new plants would make the world's 
food still more abundant by calling forth still more plant innovations. 
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Renewed attention to intellectual property protection also no doubt came from the burgeoning 
of the domestic seed market and seed industry. In constant 1967 farm dollars, seed sales had 
jumped from about $85 million in 1940, to $445 million in 1950, to $611 million in 1965.44 While 
hybrid corn sales had likely led the way, the later surge, perhaps a consequence of the 
transformation of agriculture into agribusiness, probably expressed rising demand for other types 
of seeds. Borlaug's success also indicated that considerable profits might be derived from the 
development of plant varieties for Third World markets.45 Yet European agriculture, fully 
recovered from the devastation of the war, had returned to the international markets as a vital 
competitor. And coming to fruition was a move by the European nations, begun in the 1950s, to 
establish a uniform system for the protection of plant breeder's rights. 
European plant breeders had traditionally been eager -- perhaps more so than their American 
counterparts -- for strong intellectual property protection, since the similarity of growing 
conditions in the several European states made plants developed in one nation commercially 
exploitable in another. Laws and regulations governing the protection of intellectual property in 
plants mirrored the types of protection that had developed in the United States -- patents, 
certification, trademarks, and contractual arrangements -- but also included systems of plant 
variety protection. Such systems protected intellectual property in a new variety that was distinct 
from others as well as uniform and stable in the characteristics that made it distinct. Like a 
patent, plant variety certificates let the breeder exclude other seedsmen from profiting from his 
creation for a period of seventeen years, but, reflecting the special attitudes towards natural 
products, it also constrained the rights of the breeder so as not to disadvantage farmers or 
jeopardize the food supply.46 
Whatever the mixture, the means of plant property protection varied considerably from one 
European state to the other, the principal distinction falling between plant patents and the variety 
certificates. Denmark explicitly excluded plants from patentability and Britain did so de facto. 
The Netherlands and France hewed to varietal protection, resisting plant patents, while Germany 
and Italy allowed them.47 In the past, the European states had tried intermittently to establish an 
international plant protection system that would encourage some uniformity in intellectual 
property schemes across the different states. The eagerness to accomplish that purpose no doubt 
increased in the 1950s as Europe began to move towards an economic union that would eliminate 
national barriers to competition in agricultural products. 
In 1952, at the Vienna Congress of the Association Internationale pour le Protection de Ia 
Propriete Industrielle, the major trade association for intellectual property law, the German 
delegation advocated complementary plant patent and plant certification systems. The Germans 
proposed that the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, which had been 
adopted in 1883 and which in successive versions had endorsed the protection of living products 
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in principle, be amended explicitly to allow the patentability of plants of ensurable 
reproducibility and industrial-like applicability. The German group also urged the establishment 
of a parallel system of "protection for varieties of plants, for which less exacting requirements 
regarding novelty and degree of invention should be applied."48 The Association declined to act 
on the German proposal in 1952 and, again, at its Brussels meeting in 1954. (Indeed, the 
Strasbourg Convention, a European agreement on patents adopted in 1963, would declare that 
member states would "not be bound" to grant patents on "plant or animal varieties or essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals.")49 
In the meantime, the plant breeders took their cause elsewhere --to the principal European 
breeders' trade group, the Association Internationale des Selectionneurs pour Ia Protection des 
Obtentions Vegetates. In 1957, prompted by the association, the French government hosted a 
conference on plant breeder's rights to which nine governments sent delegations. The agenda for 
the meeting, circulated by the French, strongly implied that, in the view of the conveners, the 
creations of plant breeders were so unlike industrial inventions as to be fundamentally 
inappropriate for patent protection. That view prevailed at the conference and in the succeeding 
deliberations of a Committee of Experts that the conference, at its close, agreed to examine the 
legal issue of breeder's rights. In 1960, in its final report, the committee concluded that plant 
protection required the establishment of a convention separate and distinct from the existing Paris 
Convention on Industrial Property. Thus, in Paris, on December 2, 1961, an International 
Conference for the Protection of New Plant Products adopted its own Convention of Paris, which 
formally created the Union International pour Ia Protection des Obtentions Vegetate (UPOV).50 
Following existing national plant variety protection laws, UPOV required member states to 
provide the option of intellectual property protection for at least fifteen years on plant varieties 
that were distinctly new, homogeneous, and stable. It allowed the states to grant patents on plants 
but not to give double protection -- that is, a patent and varietal right in the same plant. The 
UPOV regulations also expressed recognition of the differences between the stuff of industrial 
patents and living matter -- particularly that disclosure of the essential characteristics of living 
matter was, in the case of plants, a meaningless requirement and that such matter could be of vital 
importance to human survival. Instead of disclosing their plant innovations, breeders had to 
submit them for testing of their distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability. They also had to 
maintain the plant throughout the period it was protected. Furthermore, the intellectual property 
protection granted in the plant was not to prevent other breeders from using it without 
authorization to develop new varieties of their own. And the exclusivity of the protection had to 
yield to compulsory licensing -- with due compensation -- if some public interest required use of 
the plant.51 
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UPOV's provisions were highly specific, and, unlike the Paris Convention on Industrial 
Property, which was relatively lax in its demands on member states, UPOV required that its 
member states conform to them. To become effective, UPOV had to be ratified by at least three 
states, and the process of conformation took some time. UPOV finally entered into force in 1968, 
when it was ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom. By 1977, the signatories would also include Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and 
Switzerland. 52 
In the United States, on 21 February 1967, Senator John L. McClellan, of Arkansas, chairman 
of the Senate subcommittee concerned with patents, introduced S. 1042, a bill from President 
Lyndon Johnson's administration for a general revision of the patent laws that aimed, in part, "to 
harmonize U.S. practice with that of other nations as a step toward closer international 
cooperation and increased international trade." American seedmen, well aware of the creation of 
UPOV and its provisions, urged that McClellan's bill be amended to add the phrase "or sexually" 
to the 1930 Plant Patent Act, thus extending patent protection to seed-propagated plants.53 
Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman also objected, contending that patent protection 
for seed-propagated plants would undercut his department's longstanding programs of breeding 
plants for development and sale by seedmen and nurserymen, particularly by jeopardizing "free 
and uninhibited communication among breeders, both public and private." He also warned that 
his Department could not enforce such an act -- because "many varieties of crop plants exhibit a 
change in genetic composition from year to year, so that a variety, in a few years would no longer 
fit the description of the basis on which it was patented." The problem of unenforceability was 
also emphasized to McClellan's subcommittee by Paul Stark himself, who not only recalled its 
importance in the 1930 rejection of patents for seed-propaged plants but who gathered expert 
testimony from a number of crop scientists to argue that it was no less valid now. In Stark's 
opinion, seed-propagated plants merited some kind of intellectual property protection, but not in 
the same section of federal law that granted such protection to asexually reproduced plants. 
Opposition also came from the American Farm Bureau Federation, which declared seed 
certification programs sufficient safeguards for the interests of breeders of sexually reproducing 
plants. 54 The Federation, which spoke primarily for consumers rather than producers of seed, was 
one of the most powerful agricultural lobbies in the country. 
However, since the 1930s the plant and seed industry had burgeoned in power and allies as 
well as sales -- had become a part of agribusiness -- and it had more of a stake in intellectual 
property protection. In a letter to McClellan on behalf of the American Seed Trade Association 
and the National Council of Commercial Plant Breeders, John I. Sutherland, the executive vice 
president of the seed group, pointed out that twenty years earlier very few proprietary varieties 
had been released by seedmen because the agriculture department and experiment stations had 
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been breeding and releasing the new varieties. Sutherland added that seed companies had invested 
in research staff and facilities and produced proprietary varieties that were superior to public 
varieties and bred true. These developments had reduced the need for public investment in 
varietal research and for an increase in protection for private investment in new plants. 
Sutherland noted that "many large associations are 100% in favor of this amendment," citing as 
examplary evidence a resolution of the National Canners' Association and endorsment from the 
American Association of Nurserymen. Paul Stark obviously no longer represented the nurserymen: 
His crop-science experts comprised primarily faculty at state universities and experiment 
stations -- public breeders.55 
While the proposed "or-sexually" amendment failed, the American Seed Trade Association 
managed to obtain the introduction in mid-1969 of a new bill -- an act for plant variety 
protection ala UPOV rather than by patents. In June 1970, at hearings on the measure --it was 
designated S.3070 -- in the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senator B. Everett 
Jordan, of North Carolina, managed to take testimony from fifteen witnesses, all from the seed 
industry, in fifty-five minutes. Jordan declared, "I do not think that I have ever held a hearing 
that was more more for one side than this one." On 21 August 1970, S. 3070 was reported out of 
that committee and sent for review to the Subcommittee on Patents and Trademarks of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, which found that it did "not alter protection currently available 
within the patent system." On October 2, 1970, the Senate took up S. 3070 as "an unobjected-to 
item" and passed it without a recorded vote.56 
In the House, Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, a Democrat from Madison, Wisconsin, whose 
district included the state university and a large number of farms, objected to the notion of plant 
breeder's rights, insisting that the country had done just fine without it. Furthermore, as 
chairman of the Judiciary subcommittee that was involved with patents, he was concerned about 
how the adminstration of the act would be financed, which question virtually monopolized the 
succeeding hour of floor debate on the bill.57 The bill, slightly amended to deal with how fees 
collected in administering the act would be handled, passed on a voice vote on December 8, 1970 
and, on December 28, President Richard M. Nixon signed it into law.58 
In its main features, the Plant Variety Protection Act was a product of the UPOV model 
refracted through the demands of relevant American interest groups. It established a system of 
breeder's rights to be administered by the Plant Variety Protection Office (PVPO) at the 
Department of Agriculture headquarters in Beltsville, Maryland. The rights were given the form 
of Plant Variety Protection Certificates (PVPCs) to be issued for seventeen years to new varieties 
that are distinct, stable, and uniform. Any plant could qualify, except the so-called "soup 
vegetables" -- tomatos, okra, peppers, carrots, cucumbers and celery -- which were excluded 
from coverage at the urging of the Campbell Soup Company. Campbell feared that the PVPA 
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would increase the costs of these vegetable and close off sources for hybridization programs, 
perhaps its own.59 
Breeders would apply for a protection certificate by submitting a written description of the 
plant. The PVPO was to provide a list of roughly 500 descriptors for each class of plant, 
requiring the applicant to disclose much more data than applicants for plant patents. Each 
applicant's data would then be tested for distinctiveness against similar data compiled from other 
applicants and existing public varieties already described in seed trade journals. Breeders were 
also required to deposit 2500 seeds, to be kept viable for the period of the certificate at a USDA 
gene bank in Fort Collins, Colorado, where the seed would be stored in refrigerated quart jars.60 
While the PVPO computerized data base would test for distinctiveness, it was assumed that the 
seedmen themselves would assure uniformity and stability, since these characteristics were 
advertised as indicators of seed quality. Farmers paid a premium for seed that was "uniform" 
within a generation, and "stable" across generations. The PVPA was connected with the seed 
certification provisions of the Federal Seed Act; certificate holders could request that the 
government inspect their seed and certify the label on their seed packages. Also, breeders could 
register data on their varieties with the PVP Office and could sell their seed as quality certified 
without incurring the expense of applying for a plant variety certificate. Seed certification 
entailed using seed production and conditioning standards in combination with a system of record 
keeping and field and seed inspections by agents from the Department of Agriculture to protect 
the genetic purity and maintain the genetic identity of varieties. 
Like the UPOV requirements, the PVPA provided for a research exemption, which allowed 
any researcher to use protected seed to develop new, distinct varieties. If necessary, the seeds 
could be drawn from the Fort Collins gene bank. Also like UPOV, the PVPA included a public 
interest exemption, authorized the secretary of agriculture to demand compulsory licensing and 
mandatory commercialization when the PVPC holder did not release a variety crucial to the health 
of the American economy. Farmers associations also insisted upon a farmer's exemption, allowing 
anyone to save and replant protected seed from year to year so long as the person's primary 
business was not reproducing seed for sale.61 
The act stipulated that breeders could disseminate seeds for testing without jeopardizing their 
claims to priority. Verifying the utility of a new variety took many years and required that seed 
be widely disseminated to various grow-out plots owned by different companies. To qualify for 
the testing exemption, the breeder needed to submit a PVPC application to register the variety 
name, and then to label all bags of seed. However, these requirements also controlled the purity 
of the seed at each step in the multiplying process. In that way, the PVPA offered the same sort 
of intellectual property protection as a trademark. Farmers selling protected seed would make 
themselves obvious by advertising the protected name of the variety; and UPOV states would be 
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unable to do what they had long done -- sell American seed under a different brand name.62 
* * * 
The United States had not adhered to UPOV, primarily because of the convention's 
prohibition against double protection -- that is, both patent and varietal protection for the same 
type of plant. In the 1970s, eager to have the United States as a member, the UPOV countries 
negotiated a revision of the convention to accommodate the protections provided by the Plant 
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Acts. Adopted in 1978, the modified convention allowed, 
among other things, any member state to give both patent and varietal protection to the same 
genus or species of plant if both types of protection were in place before October 31, 1979, the 
deadline for signing the new UPOV text.63 On October 28, 1978, the United States signed the 
convention, subject to ratification of its adherence by the American government and revisions of 
its plant variety protection law into conformity with UPOV requirements. 
While closely following those requirements already, the PVPA departed from them in minor 
respects, particularly in granting its protection certificates for seventeen instead of eighteen years. 
An opportunity to obtain the necessary change arose in 1979, when Senator Frank Church, of 
Idaho, introduced a bill to accomplish certain "minor housekeeping" amendments to the act. Part 
of Church's cleanup concerned removal of the exclusion from varietal protection that had been 
granted to the six soup vegetables, The exclusion had prompted strong complaints from plant 
breeders, had redirected research in those vegetables in the hybrid direction, and now no longer 
interested the Campbell Soup Company. At the prompting of the Department of Agriculture, an 
additional bill was introduced by Senator Herman Talmadge, of Georgia, to extend the term of 
protection to eighteen years.64 
Hearings on the bills, held in the House in June 1979 and April 1980, called forth a diverse 
range of opinions on intellectual property protection in plants, not all of it friendly. Similar 
unhappiness cropped up in some of the briefs that figured in the final round of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, which challenged the longstanding doctrine of the general non-patentability of 
living organisms and happened to reach the Supreme Court for argument in the middle of the 
Congressional deliberations on the PVPA. 
The case had originated in 1972, when Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist at the General 
Electric Co., had applied for a patent on a variety of bacteria that he had bred and engineered to 
break down most of the hydrocarbons in petroleum. The U.S. Patent Office had rejected his 
application for several successive reasons but chose to make its final stand on the ground that 
Congress had not authorized patent protection for any living organism other than the types 
specified in the Plant Patent Act. In the mid-1970s, Chakrabarty's claim became entwined with a 
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complementary case advanced by Malcolm E. Bergy and fellow scientists at the Upjohn Company, 
who had applied for a patent on a purified strain of a fungus that generated the antibiotic 
lyncomycin.65 As with Chakrabarty's claim, the Board of Appeals in the Patent Office rejected 
that of Bergy et al because the fungus was alive, warning that a liberal interpretation of the 
patent code would lead to the patenting of "new types of insects, such as honeybees, or new 
varieties of animals produced by selective breeding and crossbreeding."66 
In 1977, the fungus claim came to the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which ruled 
three to two in favor of Bergy. The majority opinion was delivered by Judge Giles S. Rich, who, 
before his appointment to the federal bench, in 1956, had distinguished himself as a patent 
attorney during some thirty years of practice in New York City and who manifestly recognized 
that, to a considerable extent, life was chemistry. Rich viewed it as "illogical" to allow patents for 
processes that relied upon the functions of living organisms but to deny patents to a living 
manufacture or new composition of matter as such. He contended that in their nature and 
commercial uses, biologically pure cultures of microorganisms were "much more akin to inanimate 
chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents, and catalysts than they are to horses and 
honeybees or raspberries and roses." He found nothing in the language of the patent laws that 
excluded such tools from patent protection solely on grounds of their being alive; it was being 
alive that made them useful. He held, "In short, we think the fact that microorganisms, as 
distinguished from chemical compounds, are alive is a distinction without legal significance."67 
When, in March 1978, the appeals court decided Chakrabarty's claim, a majority ruled similarly 
in his favor. Judge Rich, speaking for the majority, saw only one issue --- the patentability of 
living organisms. The Court had dealt with the identical issue in the Bergy case and found its 
reasoning there sufficient and controlling.68 The case reached the Supreme Court because the 
Patent Office, dissatisfied, appealed it, in the name of Patent Commissioner Sidney Diamond, 
who formally contested only Chakrabarty because at the beginning of 1980 Bergy withdrew from 
the process. 
The PVPA hearings and the arguments before the court revealed that by the beginning of the 
1980s a coalition had formed in opposition to the enlargement of intellectual property protection 
in living organisms, including plants. The dissidents represented consumer organizations, small 
farmers and share croppers, public interest scientists, and the People's Business Commission, 
which was headed by the social activist and opponent of genetic engineering Jeremy Rifkin. 
During Chakrabarty, the People's Business Commission filed an amicus brief alleging to the 
Supreme Court that the Plant Patent and the Plant Variety Protection acts were directly 
responsible for a dangerous and steady reduction in the number of varieties cultivated in major 
food crops -- for example, the number of different strains of wheat -- and the resultant 
narrowing of each crop's genetic diversity. Many native strains of plants were being lost as 
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farmers replaced them with a few superior varieties. And the less genetically diverse a crop, the 
more susceptible it was to one or another disease. Indeed, in 1970, a corn blight had wiped out 
nearly fifteen percent of that crop in the United States, prompting a study by the National 
Academy of Sciences to note that "genetic uniformity is the basis of vulnerability to epidemics" 
and to add that "most crops are impressively uniform genetically and impressively vulnerable."69 
According to the Commission's brief, the reduction in crop varieties was the consequence of 
plant patents (the brief casually lumped together under the term "patents" both the genuine 
patents established by the 1930 act and the weaker protection certificates provided by the 1970 
act). In the brief's analysis, seed and grain companies bred only those plants that could be 
patented -- a small number, it held -- and then (somehow) persuaded farmers to buy and 
substitute them for native strains. Furthermore, a few large corporations -- frequently the same 
drug and chemical companies that were beginning to invest in biotechnology -- had been 
acquiring independent seed companies and their plant "patents" (protection certificates). For 
example, Upjohn, together with three other companies, now held 79% of such "patents" in beans. 
The overall result: "thanks to the patent laws, the bulk of the world's food supply is now owned 
and developed by a handful of corporations which alone, without any public input, determine 
which strains are used and how."70 
In hearings on the PVPA, various witnesses raised the same issues and enlarged on them, 
attacking the acquisition of seed farms by large petrochemical companies, some of them 
European, warning that the trend would lead to concentrated industrial control over essential food 
resources. They blamed the trend for the fact that already average cost of seeds and shoots per 
farm had risen by 164% between 1972 and 1977, a greater increase than the rise in prices in all 
other farm inputs, including fuel. They charged that Third World countries were being supplied 
with plant varieties that, while high in yield, were also high in cost.71 They contended that the 
number of new varieties released had declined since 1968 because, as Gary Nabhan, a 
conservation-minded botanist at the University of Arizona and the Arizona Desert Museum, 
testified in the PVPA hearings, "regional seed companies have been consolidated and bought up 
by multinational corporations that are not interested in diversity." Nabhan added that the 
extension of intellectual property protection to plants had also fostered breeders' secrecy, 
declaring that "since 1972, not a single private agribusiness breeder has published descriptions of 
breeding schemes or techniques for their new varieties in the section on "Cultivar and Germplasm 
Releases," a part of the magazine HortScience, the most popular outlet for such information 
among university and government breeders."72 
The dissidents made little headway with the decisionmakers in either the Supreme Court or 
the Congress. On June 16, 1980, the Court held, by a vote of five to four, that Chakrabarty had a 
right, within existing statutes, to a patent on his microorganism. Chief Justice Warren Burger 
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delivered the majority opinion, which echoed much of the reasoning in the appeals court opinion 
of Judge Rich. Justice Burger enthused over the broad language that Jefferson had written into 
the patent law of 1793, calling it expressive of its author's "philosophy that 'ingenuity should 
receive a liberal encouragement'" and noted that all succeeding Congresses had left Jefferson's 
language virtually intact. Rejecting the contentions of the Patent Office, he found that the patent 
code as written was ample enough to accommodate inventions in areas unforeseen by Congress, 
including genetic technology, and to cover living microorganisms. Congress, in passing the plant 
acts of 1930 and 1970, had "recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and 
inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made 
inventions." Chakrabarty's bugs were new compositions of matter, the product of his ingenuity, 
not of nature's. As such, they were patentable under existing law.73 
During the Supreme Court's consideration of the case, the People's Business Commission brief 
had argued that, if patents on microorganisms were allowed, patents on higher life forms would 
soon follow. That claim had been earlier contested, before Judge Rich's court, by parties with a 
substantial interest in the patenting of life, including, notably, the University of California, 
which co-owned the patent on recombinant DNA and expected to collect royalties on organisms 
produced through the use of that technique. In its amicus brief, the University contended that at 
issue was only the patentability of "single-cell organisms which are mindless, soulless and 
brainless," not that of higher life forms. Judge Rich echoed that reasoning, taking note in his 
opinion of the fear that allowing patents for microorganisms would make patentable "all new, 
useful, and unobvious species of plants, animals, and insects created by man" -- and declaring the 
fear "far-fetched."74 Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger took a 
more agnostic, though implicitly Rich-like position, on the congeries of apprehensions that 
surrounded genetic engineering. While acknowledging "that, at times, human ingenuity seems 
unable to control fully the forces it creates," he observed that genetic research with its attendant 
risks would likely proceed with or without patent protection for its products and that neither 
legislative nor judicial fiat as to patentability would "deter the scientific mind from probing into 
the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides." More important, the Court's task 
was the "narrow one of determining what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute" --
which the Court had done -- and once that was accomplished, its powers were "exhausted."75 
In November 1980, the revision of the PVPA came to the floor of the House under the 
guidance of Congressman Eligio (Kiki) de la Garza, a Democrat from Mission, in the Rio Grande 
Valley, Texas, and vice chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture. Earlier, in the 
hearings, de la Garza had allowed that he did wonder how the protection of pepper plants might 
affect his "little chili patch"; even so, he had considered it unlikely that Congress would overturn 
the PVPA: "The fellow that came with his seeds -- a Johnny Appleseed walking across the plain. 
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We cannot go back to that, and without some form of protection you are back to the law of the 
jungle."76 On the House floor, de la Garza argued that the PVPA had brought more private 
capital into improving plants, noting that "absent legal protection, private development efforts are 
often limited to the production of hybrid varieties." He contended that the PVPA did not 
encourage uniformity in crops, that, indeed, it encouraged the reverse, since to obtain a 
protection certificate the new plant had to be distinct from other varieties.77 He pointed out, 
using data that apparently came from the Plant Variety Protection Office, that since 1970 "the 
number of new varieties has increased from 94 to 227 (141 percent) for soybeans, from 139 to 231 
(66 percent) for wheat, and from 64 to 96 (50 percent) for cotton."78 The bill to revise the PVPA 
swept through the House and the Senate on voice votes, with its soup-vegetable coverage and 
eighteen-year certificate term intact, and, on December 11, 1980, was signed into law by 
President Jimmy Carter. By 1983, following certain adjustments in UPOV regulations and the 
adminstration of the PVPA, the United States had become a full UPOV member state.79 
While the dissidents lost on the major issue of intellectual property protection, they did 
stimulate concern in the Congress about whether the PVPA might, as Representative Shirley 
Chisholm, a liberal Democrat from Brooklyn, New York, put it, "be contributing to future food 
disasters in an increasingly hungry world."80 Senator Patrick Leahy, a Democrat from Burlington, 
Vermont, with a strong interest in agriculture, read a letter into the Congressional Record that 
asked Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland to initiate a study of germplasm storage and the 
general effect of the PVPA on "increasing concentration in the seed trade industry, loss of genetic 
diversity, and rapid increases in the price of seed." Leahy promised that the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture would hold hearings the next year "into the broad effects of PVPA," because "the 
possible ramifications of the plant patenting process on smaller seed companies and our 
germplasm resources are too great to do otherwise."81 However, the 1980 elections brought a 
Republican majority to the Senate and a new chairman to the agriculture committee -- the 
conservative Republican Jesse Helms, of North Carolina, who did not schedule the promised 
hearings. 
Such hearings would have served a public interest, since the critics of the PVPA and 
biotechnology patents did raise troublesome issues for public policy: The loss of genetic diversity 
and the trend to concentration in the plant and seed industry were genuine. However, it was 
questionable whether they were the result of the grant of intellectual property protection to 
plants. Loss of diversity had followed upon the Green Revolution, which involved innovations 
without intellectual property protection. Plant variety certificates may have figured to some 
extent in the growing agribusiness concentration, but, like patents in other industries, they could 
also be extremely valuable to small start-up firms in attracting venture capital. 
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Indeed, the evidence suggests that, contrary to the fears of the critics and consistent with 
Congressman de Ia Garza's rebuttal of them, the enlargement of intellectual property protection to 
include seed-propagated plants had increased rather than reduced the number of plant varieties 
available to the American public. For example, as many new varieties of wheat were developed in 
the seven years after the passage of the PVPA as in the seventeen years before it. In the decade 
after 1970, the number of seed companies increased, especially in wheat, cereal grains, and 
soybeans (before that year, six companies had been engaged in the development of soybean 
varieties; by 1980, the number was twenty-five). During the same period, almost 1,000 
applications were submitted for plant variety protection certificates on 57 distinct crops. About 
ten percent of these came from agricultural experiment stations at colleges and universities; about 
twenty percent, from the six largest U.S. seed companies; and almost 70%, from private breeders 
of all sizes.82 
In the early 1980s, free-market incentives and hitech competitiveness became the hallmarks of 
agricultural innovation. While the biotechnology industry that mushroomed into existence at the 
end of the 1970s had at first been concerned primarily with pharmaceuticals, by the beginning of 
the 1980s investors were paying greater attention to scientists like Raymond Valentine, a plant 
geneticist at the University of California, Davis, and a founder of the biotech firm Calgene, who 
told Newsweek: "Potentially any gene or genetic trait can be inserted into any plant to produce 
any results. This is the beginning of the second green revolution." By the beginning of the 1980s, 
the biotech industry included a substantial and growing agricultural sector comprising giant 
petrochemical firms like the Monsanto Corporation and small startups like Calgene. The firms 
were trying to engineer plants genetically so that they would, for example, have greater disease 
resistance or be able to fix their own nitrogen.83 
Such engineering promised to overcome the longstanding problem of biological specificity in 
intellectual property protection for plants. Like the Plant Patent Act, the PVPA recognized the 
problem in its requirements that a plant qualifying for a certificate did not have to meet the key 
criteria for an industrial patent -- that is, be novel, nonobvious to those skilled in the art, and 
useful -- but only had to demonstrate distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability. These were 
criteria of identification and quality rather than of some innovative essence, which defied 
specification. However, plant developments that involved molecular genetic intervention 
amounted to innovations whose essence could be defined with chemical specificity and whose 
character could be expected to be transmitted intact through the generations. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court had opened a broad precedent by conceding that, so far 
as the patent laws were concerned, life is chemistry and that any new composition of matter made 
by man qualified for a patent, no matter whether it was dead or alive. In the view of patent 
lawyers, there was no logical space between the patentability of a microorganism and of a higher 
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life form, including plants and animals. Indeed, it was precisely the premises and reasoning that 
lay behind the the Chakrabarty ruling that led, in 1985, to the grant of a utility patent to Kenneth 
Hibberd, a scientist at a subsidiary of Molecular Genetics Research, Inc., in Minnetonka, 
Minnesota. Hibberd had applied for a patent under the industrial patent laws for a type of 
genetically engineered corn -- "a maize seed having an endogenous free tryptophan content of at 
least one-tenth milligram per gram dry seed weight and capable of germinating into a plant 
capable of producing seed" with the same level of free tryptophan.84 The Patent Office 
examiners denied the application, claiming that Congress had intended plants to be protected 
exclusively under the Plant Patent Act and the PVPA. However, the Patent and Trademark 
Appeals Board held, in Ex oarte Hibberd, that the utility patent law (35 USC 101) "has not been 
narrowed or restricted" by the passage of the PPA or PVPA, that it predated both acts, and that -
- with genuflection to Diamond v. Chakrabarty -- these plant-specific acts did not "represent 
exclusive forms of protection for plant life."85 
By 1988, 42 utility patents had been issued for crop plants, including 11 for corn, six for 
sunflowers, and five for soybeans.86 The number was hardly large, not least because expectations 
of quick genetic engineering innovations in plants proved to be highly exaggerated. However, the 
drive for plant patenting has steadily beaten back even the traditional European opposition to the 
practice. The European Patent Convention, adopted in 1973 to supersede the Strasbourg 
Convention of a decade earlier, included a clause that went beyond the Strasbourg provisions by 
prohibiting patents on plant and animal varieties.87 However, in 1988, the Technical Board of 
Appeals of the European Patent Office upheld a patent claim on "propagative material [seeds] for 
cultivated plants, treated with an oxime derivative," since the propagating material claimed was 
not in the genetically fixed form of the plant variety, excluded by the European Convention.88 
In March 1991, UPOV, meeting in Geneva, voted to abolish its prohibition against double 
protection, subject to ratification by the member states, and it seemed likely that the patentability 
of plants and animals would soon be allowed in the European Patent Convention by case decision, 
revision of the convention, or both.89 
The pending shift has been a consequence of the hitech policymaking that takes biotechnology to 
be an essential part of the armamentarium of international competitiveness. It has also resulted 
from the fact that molecular biology has not only transformed plant innovation but also made 
biological specification of the innovation exact. 
The historical record suggests that if any single category of developments has shaped the 
evolution of intellectual property protection for plants in the United States (and probably 
elsewhere), it is advances in biological specificity and control over reproduction. Biological 
science has, of course, not determined the system of intellectual property protection for plants 
that has come to prevail. The historical record makes indelibly clear that the current system has 
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been produced by the melding of technical developments with economic and political forces, 
particularly the constant determination of private breeders to exploit their products. But in the 
absence of specificity and control, private breeders were content to let their public counterparts 
bear the principal costs of plant innovation and to exploit the public product for market purposes. 
The greater the degree of specificity and control, the stronger the incentive for the private 
breeder to invest in innovation, because he could define it and thus seek to protect and enforce 
his right in it. Indeed, at each turning point in the development of intellectual property protection 
for plants-- in 1930, 1970, and 1983 --the change in law or policy has expressed the state of 
specificity and control available at the time and provided a strength and scope of protection 
consistent with it. Now that plant innovation has become so much a matter of biochemistry and 
molecular genetics -- so hi-tech, one might say -- its structure of research and development has 
come increasingly to resemble that of other hi-tech industries: the federal government bears the 
costs of basic research, yielding the public good of knowledge useful to the entire plant industry, 
while private breeders exploit that knowledge to develop innovations in plants, confident that 
they can obtain intellectual property protection for the results. 
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